Prompt injection
Text that becomes a command.
Untrusted text is kept apart from instructions, and every action is checked against an allowlist.
Built to be trusted.
Security and governance go in with the first line of code, not bolted on after the incident.
You leave with a filled-in Job Card.
Private data, untrusted content and a way out. Put all three in one agent and one bad email leaks everything.
The lethal trifecta
Private data
Customer records, internal docs, anything the public shouldn't see.
Untrusted content
Inbound email, web pages, PDFs, calendar invites. Anything an outsider can write.
A way out
Sending messages, posting to URLs, calling outside APIs.
All three in one agent: one prompt injection from a leak.
Never shipped
How we build it
Reader agent
Reads the untrusted content. Has no network tool.
Passes a typed contract
Sender agent
Holds the network tool. Never reads raw input.
Allowlist only
Approved destinations, nothing else
We design the split during the build, not after the incident.
The threats that break agents in production, and the defense that ships with every agent we build.
Closed: 0 of 5
The same defenses ship with every agent. Nothing gets bolted on later.
Text that becomes a command.
Untrusted text is kept apart from instructions, and every action is checked against an allowlist.
The search index is the new lock.
Access is enforced at the index, scoped to the person asking. It can't surface what they can't see.
Your team already uses AI.
We find which tools, with what data, then give people a safe default they actually use.
No tool it doesn't need.
A written tool list, scoped credentials per environment, and kill switches that get tested.
The key it uses is the key they steal.
One key per agent, short rotation, least permission. Never in the code, never in the logs.
Sending an outside message, moving money, writing to a system of record, deleting data. The agent waits for a person.
You approve what matters. It does the rest.
Governance lives in the code, not the deck. If a control doesn't produce an artifact, it isn't a control.
Six controls, six artifacts
Its rules, versioned in your repo.
Handbook in the repo
Which models, for which tasks.
Gateway allowlist
What never goes in a prompt.
Redaction rules
Every action, escalation and override.
Append-only log
One command to stop. A tested way back.
Rollback runbook
Written into the agent's charter.
Signoff in the log
One control table, three frameworks
Risk class, transparency and human oversight, mapped to your gates and your log.
Govern, Map, Measure, Manage: traced to the policy, the charter, the test set and the kill switch.
Clause to control to evidence, in one pass.
Code, keys and accounts in your name. Fire us and it keeps running.
Every YNDR agent also ships with Memory, Governance, Learning and a Night Agent. Ask about them on the call.
One the agent reads every turn. One your team reads on day one. Both are versioned like code.
Every turn
For the agent
Day one
For your team
Your team owns the agent, not the other way around.
The standard questionnaire items, answered plainly. Ask on the call for anything not listed here.
Thirty minutes. Bring your security team and your worst process. You leave with a filled-in Job Card.
Book a 30-minute call